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M. he behavior of the monetary aggre-
gates—particularly M2—is often an im-
portant consideration in the Federal
Reserve's monetary policy decisions.
1
The Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC), the monetary policymaking arm
of the Federal Reserve System, periodi-
cally sets a target range for M2 growth,
based on economic conditions and on its
policy stance. In order to steer M2 growth
within these bounds (currently 2'/2 and
6V2 percent), policymakers must be able
to predict with precision the demand for
M2. This entails understanding why indi-
viduals and institutions hold transactions
and savings deposits. The determining
factors have traditionally been the level
of income and the opportunity cost of
holding M2 balances. Until recent years,
these factors have accurately predicted
M2 growth.
Since about 1989, M2 growth has been
consistently weaker than predicted. This
unanticipated weakness is worrisome,
because it may impart unintended effects
on the economy, such as a slowdown in
aggregate spending. Chairman Green-
span's February Humphrey-Hawkins
testimony acknowledged this concern
by indicating that the policy easings in
early 1990 were partly designed to rein-
vigorate M2 growth and thus to guard
against this possibility. However,
without understanding the underlying
reasons for the shortfall, it is conceiv-
able that, if temporary, M2's weakness
could turn around and that the recent
policy easings could lead to a greater-
than-intended economic stimulus.
Therefore, even though M2 growth is
currently around the midpoint of its
1991 target range, it is important to un-
derstand why the aggregate has consis-
tently deviated from its expected path
in recent years.
Chairman Greenspan's testimony of-
fered several explanations for the unan-
ticipated shortfall in M2 growth. One
of these explanations, the extraordinary
decline in assets at depository institu-
tions, is related to the restructuring of
the thrift industry. Thrifts' assets and
deposit base have contracted substan-
tially since 1988 (see figure 1). It has
been suggested that, as a result of
reduced confidence in the industry and
lower interest rates that followed
restructuring, some of the money flow-
ing out of closed thrifts has not immedi-
ately flowed into other depositories,
but has been channeled into instru-
ments such as U.S. Treasury bills,
which are not included in M2.
In this Economic Commentary, we ex-
amine how the the unexpected slowdown
in M2 growth may be largely attributable
to the restructuring of the thrift industry,
and we explain why economic models




The effects of thrift restructuring on
deposit growth seem evident in the be-
havior of savings deposits, small time
deposits, and money market deposit
The weakness in M2 is a complex
development and requires careful inter-
pretation. The shortfall from our expec-
tations appeared to be related to the
stalling of nominal income in the fourth
quarter [of 1990], and also to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the extraordi-
nary decline in assets at depository
institutions last year, which in turn had
implications for future as well as cur-
rent spending....Our policy easings over
recent months were keyed partly to rein-
vigorating growth ofM2 to a rate more
likely to be consistent with satisfactory
economic performance.
—Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System,
1991 Monetary Policy Objectives,
Humphrey-Hawkins Testimony,
February 20, 1991
ISSN 0428-1276accounts (see figure 2). The slow
growth of these deposits accounted for
much of the weakness in M2 from
April 1990 to January 1991, and their
subsequent rapid growth has to a large
extent driven M2's surge in early 1991.
When these M2 components are broken
down by issuing institution, it becomes
apparent that the softness stems largely
from the substantial drop in these deposits
at thrifts (see figure 3). Although banks
have acquired some of these funds, the
additional deposits only partially offset
the effects of the thrift contraction.
To understand the connection between
thrift restructuring and M2 growth, it is
useful to review some key events that
led to the current situation and to exam-
ine their implications for deposit pric-
ing and, in turn, for M2 opportunity
cost. The opportunity cost of M2 is
commonly measured as the difference
in the interest rate paid on M2
deposits—its own rate—and the inter-
est rate that depositors could earn on a
similar money market instrument.
Many analysts believe the thrift prob-
lem originated in the 1970s. Rising in-
flation and a consequent jump in nomi-
nal interest rates in that decade were
particularly troublesome for thrifts,
which according to regulatory design
had borrowed short (deposits) and lent
long (mortgages). Because rising inter-
est rates were unanticipated, thrifts
found themselves holding low-yielding
mortgages but paying high rates for
funds, leading to a severe deterioration
in their capital.
Partly to alleviate the maturity mis-
match, regulators decided in the early
1980s to permit thrifts to enter pre-
viously restricted areas of banking, al-
lowing them to increase their share of
commercial and industrial loans. The
hope was that the new business would
enable insolvent or nearly insolvent
thrifts to "grow" out of their problem.
Under these circumstances, many thrift
managers took large risks with their
institutions' funds. Moreover, managers
of insolvent, but still open, thrifts often
acquired funds by offering interest
rates well above the market rate. Such
rates might normally provide a signal
for prudent depositors that an institu-
tion is on the verge of insolvency. But,
because the deposits were almost fully
insured by the federal government, de-
positors had little incentive to monitor
the riskiness of thrifts.
Once the extent of the industry's prob-
lems was evident, however, regulators
became more stringent and no longer
allowed troubled thrifts to offer rates
above those paid by solvent institutions.
More important, insolvent thrifts with
little hope of recovering were identified
and closed in a more timely fashion.
The substantial number of closures,
some have argued, has also led to a
drastic change in deposit pricing
strategy for the entire deposit market.
As institutions paying above-market
rates were eventually closed, competing
depositories were able to lower their in-
terest rates. When thrifts were closed
and their assets sold to other financial
institutions, many interest-rate contracts
were nullified or renegotiated.
Thus, interest rates on money market
deposit accounts and small time
deposits have recently been lower than
would have been expected prior to the
thrift restructuring. With lower deposit
rates and, consequently, higher oppor-
tunity costs of investing in thrift ac-
counts, one would expect that M2
growth would be lower. Although M2
growth has recently trended down, a
gap persists between our ability to
predict M2 growth and its actual
growth rate. This suggests that some-
thing is still missing from our under-
standing of recent M2 behavior.
• The Thrift Hypothesis
and Opportunity Cost
One possibility, and the one favored here,
is that the changed pricing behavior after
the thrift industry's restructuring is not
adequately captured by the measured
opportunity cost. The problem is with the
measure of the interest rate associated
with M2. This rate is computed as a
weighted average of the reported deposit
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CONTRIBUTION OF TIME AND SAVINGS
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a. Percent changes are expressed as annualized quarterly rates.
b. Including money market deposit accounts, savings deposits, and
small time deposits.
SOURCES: DRI/McGraw Hill, Board of Governors of the Federal
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SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and
authors' calculations.
rates paid on various components of
M2, where the weights are equal to the
relative share of each component.
These rates originate from a survey
conducted by the Federal Reserve and
the Office of Thrift Supervision, in
which depositories are asked to record
the "most common rate paid" on each
of several types of accounts.
However, the most common rate paid
may not be the rate most responsible
for the growth in M2. For example,
depository institutions that are in need
of funds are likely to pay rates on the
high end of the interest-rate distribution,
but the survey methodology may not in-
corporate this rate. In addition, aggrega-
tion of the rates paid on M2 deposits
could mask those rates paid by banks or
thrifts bidding aggressively for funds.
This aggregation is no problem if the dis-
tribution remains the same over time.
However, regulatory changes in recent
years are likely to have reduced the skew-
ness of deposit rates, particularly on the
high end of the distribution. Such an
effect would not be revealed as a substan-
tial decline in the measured rate paid on
M2, but depositors holding funds at
affected institutions would perceive the
effects as substantial. Many of these de-
positors, attracted by above-market rates,
could have shifted part of their funds to
instruments not included in M2 when the
high-end rates became more aligned with
the average or measured rate.
To deal with the measurement problem,
we explicitly considered the change in
thrift deposits, in addition to the tradi-
tional variables of income and oppor-
tunity cost, in predicting M2 growth.
Because deposit pricing has at times
been more aggressive at thrifts than at
banks, thrift deposit growth could in-
corporate information about the skew-
ness in the distribution of deposit rates.
The rates on the extreme end of the dis-
tribution might well account for a dis-
proportionate share of the change in
thrift deposits—for example, the attrac-
tive but unsustainable interest rates
offered by some thrifts in the early to
mid-1980s.
Figure 4 illustrates the predictions of a
money growth model that includes the
change in thrift deposits as an explan-
atory variable, while figure 5 shows the
predictions of the same model when
the thrift variable is not included/ The
statistical analysis suggests that thrift
restructuring accounts for much of the
recent unexplained weakness in M2.
• M2 and the Economy
Implications of current money growth
for the economy can be expressed in
terms of velocity—the ratio of nominal
gross national product (GNP) to the
money stock. According to the quantity
theory of money, the value of purchases
must be equal to the amount of money
in circulation and the number of times
money changes hands—the velocity.
Within this context, it is easy to see
potential problems facing policymakers
when M2 growth is different from
anticipated patterns.
M2 growth targets are set to be consis-
tent with policy objectives concerning
inflation and output growth. These tar-
gets are predicated on an assumption
about velocity, usually based on long-
term trends. However, if velocity rises
unexpectedly, achievement of the speci-
fied monetary target could lead to un-
desired policy outcomes such as higher
inflation. The extent of this unintended
stimulus to the economy depends on the
relative changes in M2 growth (as a
quantity of money) and in velocity (as
affected by a change in M2), since they
may be offsetting to some degree.
Over long periods, the velocity of M2
has not tended to show a specific trend,
which suggests a constant long-run
relationship between the quantity of
money and economic activity. In the
short run, however, M2 velocity has
generally moved systematically with in-
terest rates and opportunity cost.
Declining market interest rates tend to
reduce M2 velocity. As these rates fall,
opportunity cost drops temporarily, be-
cause changes in bank deposit rates
typically lag changes in market rates.
With a decline in bank opportunity
cost, deposit holders tend to increaseM2 balances relative to spending and
income; hence, M2 velocity falls.
However, as figure 6 illustrates, M2
velocity has not declined as sharply as
its historical relationship with oppor-
tunity cost would suggest. This is con-
sistent with our hypothesis that changes
in measured opportunity cost have not
adequately captured the deposit pricing
effects related to thrift restructuring.
An important issue is whether the im-
pact of thrift restructuring has had a
permanent effect on M2 velocity. Our
model suggests that the effects of thrift
restructuring are largely transitory, but
it does not provide much power to test
for permanent effects. Generally, such
a test is possible only after obtaining
evidence of a sustained deviation from
the historical relationship between
restructuring and M2 velocity.
• Conclusion
The recent downsizing of the entire
thrift industry has been the preeminent
development in the financial industry
in recent years. It seems likely that such
a large structural change would affect
the behavior of the monetary aggre-
gates. Our research shows that the
change in thrift deposits accounts for
much of the unanticipated weakness in
M2 growth during 1989 and 1990.
Even though the FOMC has recently
eased monetary policy, partially in re-
sponse to M2's unexpected shortfall, the
accelerated growth of this aggregate has
been slower than one might expect
given the historical relationships
among M2, output, and opportunity
cost. Consequently, M2 velocity has
been higher than expected.
If M2 velocity persists at this level,
more rapid growth of this aggregate will
be associated with more rapid growth in
income. Determining whether or not
M2 growth is consistent with intended
policy directives depends on a solid un-
derstanding of the many factors related
to M2 demand. Our research suggests
that the effect of the thrift restructuring
on M2 helps to explain much of the
recent shortfall in this aggregate.
• Footnotes
1. Seethe Federal Reserve Bulletin, any
recent issue, for definitions of the monetary
aggregates. Generally, Ml includes balances
used in making transactions, while M2 in-
cludes Ml plus household savings assets.
M3, the broadest measure, adds to M2 other
liquid assets that are held mostly by large
asset holders.
2. See Fred Furlong and Bharat Trehan, "In-
terpreting Recent Money Growth," Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, FRBSF
Weekly Letter, September 28, 1990.
3. Specifically, we estimate a money
demand function that includes the lagged
change in thrift deposits as an explanatory
variable. For the particular model, see John
B. Carlson and Sharon E. Parrott, "The
Demand for M2, Opportunity Cost, and
Financial Change," Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Economic Review, vol. 27, no. 2
(1991 Quarter 2), pp. 2-11.
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System.
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